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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS DOING BusINEss IN STATE--The amena-
bility of foreign corporations to suit in state courts has long been
a troublesome problem, both to the state courts, and, since the
problem is essentially one of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, to the federal courts.' A recent United States Su-
preme Court decision strengthens state jurisdiction without, how-
ever, clarification of principle calculated to minimize the area of
doubt. International Shoe Company v. State, 66 S.Ct. 154 (U.S.
1945).
The International Shoe Company, a Delaware corporation
whose principal place of business was St. Louis, employed eleven
to thirteen salesmen in the State of Washington. The salesmen
were mere solicitors who took orders subject to home office ap-
proval, on a commission basis. Although the company had neither
an office nor merchandise in the state, some of the agents rented
permanent sample rooms for which they were reimbursed by the
corporation. The state assessed the company under the unem-
ployment compensation act with respect to the resident em-
ployees. Notice was served by personal service on one of the
agents in addition to service by registered mail addressed to the
home office.2 On appeal the United States Supreme Court, in
affirming the judgment below, reasoned (a) that the "quality
and nature" of the activity of the company in the state "in rela-
tion to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it
was the purpose of the due process clause to insure" was such
as to subject the company to the jurisdiction for purposes of the
tax4 and the suit; and (b) that either of the forms of service re-
sorted to was sufficient notice. Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring
opinion, vigorously attacked the "vague constitutional criteria"
which was advanced by the majority. It was his opinion that
the doing of any business in the state would suffice and that the
test set forth by the majority would tend to curtail the power of
a state to regulate business carried on within its boundaries by
foreign corporations simply because their headquarters are in
other states.
1. This note relates to actions 4n personam only.
2. Timely objection to the service and to the jurisdiction was made by
special appearance before the Commissioner of Unemployment Compensa-
tion. The objection was denied and the assessment upheld. This ruling was
affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme Court over the company's contention that
it was being denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
3. 66 S.Ct. 154, 160 (U.S. 1945).
4. The court summarily disposed of the plea to jurisdiction to tax on
grounds that such unemployment taxation is expressly authorized by Con-
gress. 53 Stat. 1391, c. 666 (1935), 26 U.S.C.A. § 1606(a) (Supp. 1940).
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State and federal courts alike have been reluctant to lay
down a definite yardstick with which to measure the business
activity of foreign firms; they have preferred rather to judge
each case on its own facts.5 In dealing with this problem, how-
ever, courts have distinguished between cases (a) in which the
cause of action arose either in the state6 or out of the business
conducted there,? and (b) where the cause of action arose out
of the state.8  Cases of the latter type generally require a sub-
stantially greater degree of business activity on the part of the
corporation in order to ground jurisdiction.
Since, quite commonly, the corporation's sole contact with a
state is through its solicitors, it is not surprising that there have
been countless cases in which the question has been whether
such a corporation can be sued in the state courts without de-
privation of due process of law. Out of these cases evolved the
rule that solicitation alone does not manifest the "presence" of
the corporation.' In some instances, however, the additional re-
quirements have been negligible.10
Although, as Justice Black accuses, the court is still ad-
vancing "vague constitutional criteria," the principal case is defi-
nitely a liberalizing influence; it at least brought within these cri-
teria a set of facts which should be suggestive to state legislatures
and courts alike.
What has just been said is certainly applicable to Louisiana.
Our laws require any foreign corporation "doing business" in
the state to register with the secretary of state and to name an
agent for service of process." For failure to comply with these
requirements the statute not only provides a penalty" but also
renders the firm amenable to service of process through the sec-
5. Proctor Trust Co. v. Pope, 12 So. (2d) 724, 727 (La. App. 1943).
6. R. J. Brown Co. v. Grosjean, 189 La. 778, 180 So. 634 (1938).
7. Simon v. Southern Railway Co., 236 U.S. 115, 35 S.Ct. 255, 59 L.Ed.
492 (1915).
8. French v. Artistic Furniture Co., Inc., 173 La. 982, 139 So. 307 (1932);
Staley-Wynne Oil Corp. v. Loring Oil Co., 182 La. 1007, 162 So. 756 (1935).
Note (1936) 10 Tulane L. Rev. 639.
9. Peoples Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 38 S.Ct. 233,
62 L.Ed. 587, Ann. Cas. 1918C 537 (1918); Norm Advertising Inc. v. Parker,
172 Sc.. 586 (La. App. 1937); Schultz v. Long Island Machinery & Equipment
Co., 173 So. 569 (La. App. 1937); State v. Best & Co., 194 La. 918, 195 So. 356
(1939); National Pumps Corp. v. Bruning, 1 So. (2d) 320 (La. App. 1941).
10. International Harvester Co. of America v. Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky, 234 U.S. 579, 34 S.Ct. 944, 58 L.Ed. 1479 (1914) (holding that agent's
authority to receive payment in money, check, or draft, and to take notes
payable at banks in Kentucky was sufficient in addition to solicitation to
constitute "doing business").
11. La. Act 267 of 1914, § 23, as amended by La. Act 120 of 1920, § 1
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 12461.
12. Id. at § 24 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1247].
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retary of state"3 and at the same time precludes resort to the state
courts by the corporation. 1 4
Two factors have served to weaken these statutes in their
effect: (1) the narrow interpretation of "doing business" adopted
by our courts and (2) the necessary exclusion of firms engaged
solely in interstate commerce from the provisions of the act."
The reluctance of Louisiana courts to construe liberally the
phrase "doing business" so as to give wider effect to our state
laws on the subject is evidenced in Schultz v. Long Island Ma-
chinery and Equfpment Company, Incorporated.- This case in-
volved an action by a citizen of Louisiana against a New York
corporation on a contract for scrap iron bought by that firm. The
court refused to entertain jurisdiction in the case since the cor-
poration was not deemed to be, in the legal sense, "doing busi-
ness" in the state, although each year its agents conducted large-
scale scrap iron purchasing expeditions into the state.
In order to effect more liberal judicial treatment of "doing
business" and at the same time to minimize constitutional haz-
ards the general provisions of the present act might be so
amended as to require that a corporation be deemed to be "doing
business" in the state when the quality and nature of its activity
therein is such that it can, in the fair and orderly administration
of the laws, be subjected to the jurisdiction of the state. Were
the Black view to prevail later this language would still be ap-
plicable.
Since all corporations qualifying under the Louisiana act are
required to pay a franchise tax, the act would not be supportable
if applied to foreign corporations engaged solely in interstate
commerce in the state.17 Even so, there is ample basis for statu-
tory amendment which would require such a firm doing business
in the state to appoint an agent for service of process or submit
to service through the secretary of state for suits brought on ac-
tions arising in the state or out of the business conducted there. 8
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13. Id. at § 25 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1248].
14. La. Act 8 of 1935 (3 E.S.), § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1247.1]. But
does not preclude suits brought against corporation.
15. La. Act 267 of 1914, § 23, as amended by La. Act 120 of 1920, § 1
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1246].
16. 173 So. 569 (La. App. 1937).
17. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8.
18. International Harvester Co. of America v. Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky, 234 U.S. 579, 34 S.Ct. 944, 58 L.Ed. 1479 (1914). This case determined
that although the business carried on by a foreign corporation is entirely
interstate in its character, such firm is not immune from the ordinary proc-
ess of the courts of the state.
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